African Counterterrorism in a New Age
The changing security landscape in Somalia presents new challenges to AFRICOM and regional strategies.
Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, the country has become a focal point of regional instability, piracy, terrorism, and geopolitical competition. One of the Horn of Africa’s most volatile states has once again emerged as a litmus test for the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism strategies, especially as extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) exploit political fragmentation to expand their reach. In January 2025, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), in coordination with Puntland (an autonomous territory in Somalia) conducted airstrikes in northern Somalia that killed a senior ISS attack planner and several other operatives with al-Shabaab concurrently launching an offensive in central Somalia aimed at disrupting key infrastructure and reinfiltrating strategic areas. This article examines how recent U.S. airstrikes reflect broader strategic shifts in counterterrorism policy, analyzing their effectiveness in degrading terrorist capabilities and the challenges they pose for long-term regional stability.As global powers recalibrate their strategic priorities in Africa, Somalia remains a critical battleground where the fight against terrorism intersects with maritime security, regional stability, and great-power competition.
These operations emphasize the evolving nature of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region, which increasingly relies on precision drone strikes to disrupt transnational terrorist networks while minimizing American military footprints, which is a turnaround from previous strategies.
Somalia’s fractured governance, persistent extremist threats, and complex regional dynamics mean that these strikes carry implications far beyond their immediate tactical gains.
The United States’ counterterrorism involvement in Somalia began in the early 1990s. The infamous 1993 Black Hawk Down incident, when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed during a failed operation against a Somali warlord, led to a sharp decline in U.S. engagement.
However, the 9/11 attacks reshaped U.S. strategic priorities, bringing Somalia back into focus, due to its ungoverned spaces that provided fertile ground for terrorist organizations. The establishment of AFRICOM in 2007 further institutionalized America’s military engagement on the continent, aiming to counter terrorism and enhance regional stability.
Al- Shabaab, a jihadist group which emerged in the mid-2000s is central to U.S. counterterrorism concerns in Somalia.. Following Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in 2006 to crush the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamic group that had ended warlord control in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab (a splinter armed youth group from ICU emerging from the insurgency) gained prominence by positioning itself as a nationalist resistance force in opposition to foreign intervention, gaining popularity by capitalizing on local grievances and political instability.
In 2012, al-Shabaab formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, aligning its objectives with the global jihadist movement. The group’s ambitions extend beyond Somalia, posing regional threats by conducting attacks in Kenya and Uganda, most notably the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garissa University massacre. Al-Shabaab’s enduring resilience, with more recent terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2019 and 2022, relies on its ability to exploit clan divisions, extort local populations, and embed itself within Somalia’s social fabric.
More recently, the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) has emerged as a rival extremist faction to al-Shabab’s dominance, complicating the security landscape for Somali and international forces.For example, on February 1, 2025, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes targeting ISSP operatives in Somalia. President Trump emphasized that these strikes neutralized threats “hiding in caves” and sent a strong message to ISIS and other adversaries on social media: “WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU”.
The legal foundation underpinning U.S. military operations in Somalia, particularly drone strikes, is grounded in the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Passed by Congress in the aftermath of 9/11, the AUMF grants the president broad authority to use force against those responsible for the attacks and their associated forces. In the years since, however,this mandate has been expansively interpreted to justify actions against groups like al-Shabaab, which was designated as an al-Qaeda “associated force” in 2016. The AUMF’s lack of temporal or geographical limits effectively authorizes a perpetual, global counterterrorism campaign. This legal elasticity has allowed successive administrations to conduct drone strikes in Somalia without seeking congressional approval.
Critics argue that such expansive use of the AUMF amounts to a “boundless forever-war,” raising concerns over transparency, accountability, and the potential for civilian casualties. Proponents, however, contend that the drone strikes authorized by the Authorization provide a precise and effective means of eliminating high-value targets while minimizing U.S. military casualties.
The Obama administration sought to refine the AUMF framework but ultimately continued to rely on it extensively in Somalia and elsewhere, with the Biden administration even redeploying troops to Somalia in 2022. The Trump administration, both during its first term and currently, has embraced an aggressive counterterrorism posture, as evidenced by recent operations targeting ISSP militants.
On Jan. 1, 2025, AFRICOM, in coordination with Puntland authorities, targeted ISSP positions in the Cal Miskaad mountains, Puntland’s rugged northern region. The Cal Miskaad mountains serve as ISSP’s primary logistical hub. AFRICOM reported that the strike killed multiple ISSP operatives, including a senior attack planner, though the precise identity remains unconfirmed. The strikes involved Carrier Air Wing 1 aboard the USS Harry S. Truman, marking a notable deployment of U.S. naval airpower. AFRICOM also conducted a follow-up strike in the Gholis mountain range in Puntland, killing additional ISSP militants on February 1, 2025. Lastly, AFRICOM conducted another airstrike in northeast Somalia on February 16, 2025, killing 16 ISIS-Somalia militants, including two senior bomb-makers, and destroyed a bomb manufacturing facility.
These strikes represented a three-fold tactical success: first, by eliminating key militant leaders and disrupting ISSP operations; second, by bolstering Puntland’s ongoing counteroffensive against insurgents; and third, by weakening foreign fighter networks. By aiming for ISSP leadership—believed to oversee IS’s East African al-Karrar office, a crucial financial and logistical hub for IS networks across Africa and the Middle East—the U.S. disrupted ISSP’s ability to coordinate regional operations. U.S. officials estimate that the January 1 strike will set ISSP back by at least six months, particularly in its role as a global logistic node.
The strikes also bolstered Puntland’s ground offensive, which led to the destruction of ISSP outposts, weapons manufacturing sites, and drone stockpiles. Notably, Puntland forces seized armed commercial quadcopter drones, which, according to local officials, have previously emerged from unregulated smuggling supply lines from Yemen via the Gulf of Aden.
Lastly, ISSP includes 80% foreign fighters, many funneled through Puntland’s port capital, Bossaso. Puntland security forces, in the backdrop of this offensive, have detained hundreds of suspected foreign operatives and undocumented individuals and shut down ISSP-linked financial accounts, significantly disrupting ISSP’s recruitment and financing mechanisms.
Despite these tactical gains, two key factors could limit the long-term strategic impact of this operation: the potential for ISSP resurgence and fragmented governance in Somalia. The Cal Miskaad mountains provide ISSP with natural defensive terrain, enabling militants to retreat and regroup, and enhancing their mobility. ISSP could reconstitute from the recent strikes, and resume global operations relatively easily, threatening regional and international security. Also, Puntland’s self-reliance in counterterrorism operations complicates broader U.S. goals after Puntland severed ties with Somalia’s federal government in 2024. Such political fragmentation creates governance vacuums that ISSP could exploit.
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which succeeded the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) on January 1, 2025, comprises 11,900 personnel, including soldiers, police, and civilian support staff. The troop contributions are as follows: Uganda provides 4,500 troops, Ethiopia contributes 2,500 troops, Djibouti supplies 1,520 troops, Kenya offers 1,410 troops, and Egypt contributes 1,091 troops. However, the lack of coordination between the Somali and Puntland governments risks undermining AMISOM’s mission. For example, Djiboutian forces under AMISOM have cooperated with Somali troops in Hiiraan to counter al-Shabaab, but there is no concurrent coordination yet in Puntland. .
American airstrikes in Somalia have significantly reshaped regional security dynamics. Kenya and Ethiopia have heightened border security and surveillance efforts in response to the increased threat of cross-border retaliation and militant infiltration by al-Shabaab. Djibouti, home to the U.S. military’s Camp Lemonnier, remains strategically crucial but is wary that intensified American military actions could trigger retaliatory attacks or disrupt maritime shipping routes. Meanwhile, China and Russia are capitalizing on evolving U.S. engagement; China has established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, while Russia is deepening relations with African countries like Sudan to leverage geopolitical opportunities created by shifts in U.S. military posture.
The shifting security dynamics in Somalia highlight the need for smart, sustained U.S. engagement. Recent airstrikes against ISSP operatives show that precision drone warfare can disrupt terrorist networks without risking American lives on the ground, but tactical victories alone are not enough. With Somalia’s fractured politics, and extremists ready to exploit governance gaps, the U.S. must adopt a clear-eyed, focused approach. Containment—not costly nation-building—should drive strategy, backing local and regional partners only when it serves core American interests. At the same time, as China and Russia ramp up their influence in the Horn of Africa, U.S. strategy must also prioritize America’s broader geopolitical position through targeted aid and stronger regional alliances
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